Cryptographic defense against traffic analysis
STOC '93 Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Delayed path coupling and generating random permutations
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on on Random structures and algorithms
Randomized path coloring on binary trees
APPROX '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization
Path coupling: A technique for proving rapid mixing in Markov chains
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Attacking unlinkability: the importance of context
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Anonymous card shuffling and its applications to parallel mixnets
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
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We analyze networks of mixes used for providing untraceable communication. We consider a network consisting of k mixes working in parallel and exchanging the outputs – which is the most natural architecture for composing mixes of a certain size into networks able to mix a larger number of inputs at once. We prove that after $\mathcal{O}$(1) rounds the network considered provides a fair level of privacy protection for any number of messages n. Number of required rounds does not dependent on number of mixes provided that n ≫ k2 . No mathematical proof of this kind has been published before. We show that if at least one of server is corrupted we need substantially more rounds to meet the same requirements of privacy protection.