Networks without user observability—design options
Proc. of a workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology---EUROCRYPT '85
The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A protocol for anonymous communication over the Internet
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
ISDN-MIXes: Untraceable Communication with Small Bandwidth Overhead
Kommunikation in Verteilten Systemen, Grundlagen, Anwendungen, Betrieb, GI/ITG-Fachtagung
Mix-Networks on Permutation Networks
ASIACRYPT '99 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Protocols Using Anonymous Connections: Mobile Applications
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
MIXes in Mobile Communication Systems: Location Management with Privacy
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
FOCS '95 Proceedings of the 36th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
An Optimal Strategy for Anonymous Communication Protocols
ICDCS '02 Proceedings of the 22 nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'02)
Preserving privacy in a network of mobile computers
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
NON-DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL FOR DECENTRALIZED COMPUTING SYSTEMS
NON-DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL FOR DECENTRALIZED COMPUTING SYSTEMS
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Real-time mixes: a bandwidth-efficient anonymity protocol
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Covert channels and anonymizing networks
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
An HMM Approach to Anonymity Analysis of Continuous Mixes
Advanced Web and NetworkTechnologies, and Applications
Vida: How to Use Bayesian Inference to De-anonymize Persistent Communications
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Attacking unlinkability: the importance of context
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
A practical complexity-theoretic analysis of mix systems
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Statistical disclosure or intersection attacks on anonymity systems
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
The hitting set attack on anonymity protocols
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
Local view attack on anonymous communication
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Message splitting against the partial adversary
PET'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
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The goal of anonymity providing techniques is to preservethe privacy of users, who has communicated withwhom, for how long, and from which location, by hidingtraffic information. This is accomplished by organizing additionaltraffic to conceal particular communication relationshipsand by embedding the sender and receiver of amessage in their respective anonymity sets. If the number ofoverall participants is greater than the size of the anonymityset and if the anonymity set changes with time due to unsynchronizedparticipants, then the anonymity technique becomesprone to traffic analysis attacks. In this paper, we areinterested in the statistical properties of the disclosure attack,a newly suggested traffic analysis attack on the MIXes.Our goal is to provide analytical estimates of the number ofobservations required by the disclosure attack and to identifyfundamental (but avoidable) weak operational modes'of the MIXes and thus to protect users against a traffic analysisby the disclosure attack.