The visual display of quantitative information
The visual display of quantitative information
Towards an analysis of onion routing security
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Probabilistic Treatment of MIXes to Hamper Traffic Analysis
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Location diversity in anonymity networks
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Statistical disclosure or intersection attacks on anonymity systems
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
The hitting set attack on anonymity protocols
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
The traffic analysis of continuous-time mixes
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
On flow correlation attacks and countermeasures in mix networks
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
SAGE: a strong privacy-preserving scheme against global eavesdropping for ehealth systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications - Special issue on wireless and pervasive communications for healthcare
Sampled traffic analysis by internet-exchange-level adversaries
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Blending different latency traffic with alpha-mixing
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
NordSec'12 Proceedings of the 17th Nordic conference on Secure IT Systems
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We review threat models used in the evaluation of anonymity systems' vulnerability to traffic analysis. We then suggest that, under the partial adversary model, if multiple packets have to be sent through these systems, more anonymity can be achieved if senders route the packets via different paths. This is in contrast to the normal technique of using the same path for them all. We comment on the implications of this for message-based and connection-based anonymity systems. We then proceed to examine the only remaining traffic analysis attack – one which considers the entire system as a black box. We show that it is more difficult to execute than the literature suggests, and attempt to empirically estimate the parameters of the Mixmaster and the Mixminion systems needed in order to successfully execute the attack.