Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
On inferring autonomous system relationships in the internet
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On the correctness of IBGP configuration
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Towards an accurate AS-level traceroute tool
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Towards capturing representative AS-level Internet topologies
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Dummy traffic against long term intersection attacks
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Practical traffic analysis: extending and resisting statistical disclosure
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
The traffic analysis of continuous-time mixes
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Towards a framework for connection anonymity
SAICSIT '05 Proceedings of the 2005 annual research conference of the South African institute of computer scientists and information technologists on IT research in developing countries
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Towards application-aware anonymous routing
HOTSEC'07 Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX workshop on Hot topics in security
Shining Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
On anonymity in an electronic society: A survey of anonymous communication systems
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Scalable Link-Based Relay Selection for Anonymous Routing
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
As-awareness in Tor path selection
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Scalable onion routing with torsk
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Hashing it out in public: common failure modes of DHT-based anonymity schemes
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Survey on anonymous communications in computer networks
Computer Communications
Sampled traffic analysis by internet-exchange-level adversaries
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Drac: an architecture for anonymous low-volume communications
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Empirical tests of anonymous voice over IP
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Chipping away at censorship firewalls with user-generated content
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
Information slicing: anonymity using unreliable overlays
NSDI'07 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Networked systems design & implementation
An analysis of anonymity technology usage
TMA'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Traffic monitoring and analysis
Trust-based anonymous communication: adversary models and routing algorithms
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Stealthy traffic analysis of low-latency anonymous communication using throughput fingerprinting
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Message splitting against the partial adversary
PET'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
An overview of VoIP and P2P copyright and lawful-interception issues in the United States and Taiwan
Digital Investigation: The International Journal of Digital Forensics & Incident Response
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Users get routed: traffic correlation on tor by realistic adversaries
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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Anonymity networks have long relied on diversity of node location for protection against attacks---typically an adversary who can observe a larger fraction of the network can launch a more effective attack. We investigate the diversity of two deployed anonymity networks, Mixmaster and Tor, with respect to an adversary who controls a single Internet administrative domain. Specifically, we implement a variant of a recently proposed technique that passively estimates the set of administrative domains (also known as autonomous systems, or ASes) between two arbitrary end-hosts without having access to either end of the path. Using this technique, we analyze the AS-level paths that are likely to be used in these anonymity networks. We find several cases in each network where multiple nodes are in the same administrative domain. Further, many paths between nodes, and between nodes and popular endpoints, traverse the same domain.