Three voting protocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and twin
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Analysis, improvement and simplification of Prêt à voter with Paillier encryption
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Improving and Simplifying a Variant of Prêt à Voter
VOTE-ID '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity
VeryVote: A Voter Verifiable Code Voting System
VOTE-ID '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity
Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Voting with unconditional privacy by merging Prêt à voter and PunchScan
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Attacking unlinkability: the importance of context
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Can end-to-end verifiable e-voting be explained easily?
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Information Integration and Web-based Applications & Services
Dissent: accountable anonymous group messaging
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Election verifiability in electronic voting protocols
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
A model for system-based analysis of voting systems
Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Security protocols
Relations among privacy notions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Procedural security analysis: A methodological approach
Journal of Systems and Software
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
SOBA: secrecy-preserving observable ballot-level audit
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Prêt à Voter with Paillier encryption
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Coercion-resistant electronic elections with write-in candidates
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
Dissent in numbers: making strong anonymity scale
OSDI'12 Proceedings of the 10th USENIX conference on Operating Systems Design and Implementation
An efficient and highly sound voter verification technique and its implementation
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Paperless independently-verifiable voting
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Practical Internet voting system
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Dispute resolution in accessible voting systems: the design and use of audiotegrity
Vote-ID'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy
Journal of Computer Security
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Democracy depends on the proper administration of popular elections. Voters should receive assurance that their intent was correctly captured and that all eligible votes were correctly tallied. The election system as a whole should ensure that, voter coercion is unlikely, even when voters are willing to be influenced. These conflicting requirements present a significant challenge: how can voters receive enough assurance to trust the election result, but not so much that they can prove to a potential coercer how they voted? This dissertation explores cryptographic techniques for implementing verifiable, secret-ballot elections. We present the power of cryptographic voting, in particular its ability to successfully achieve both verifiability and ballot secrecy, a combination that cannot be achieved by other means. We review a large portion of the literature on cryptographic voting. We propose three novel technical ideas: (1) a simple and inexpensive paper-base cryptographic voting system with some interesting advantages over existing techniques; (2) a theoretical model of incoercibility for human voters with their inherent limited computational ability; and a new ballot casting system that fits the new definition, and (3) a new theoretical construct for shuffling encrypted votes in full view of public observers.