IEEE Security and Privacy
Cryptographic voting protocols: a systems perspective
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
On estimating the size and confidence of a statistical audit
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
VoteBox: a tamper-evident, verifiable electronic voting system
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Coercion-resistant tallying for STV voting
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Practical distributed voter-verifiable secret ballot system
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM symposium on Applied Computing
On Voting Process and Quantum Mechanics
QI '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Quantum Interaction
A formal framework for quantifying voter-controlled privacy
Journal of Algorithms
VOTE-ID '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity
Improving and Simplifying a Variant of Prêt à Voter
VOTE-ID '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity
FM '09 Proceedings of the 2nd World Congress on Formal Methods
Remote Electronic Voting with Revocable Anonymity
ICISS '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Systems Security
Decentralized Polling with Respectable Participants
OPODIS '09 Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Shuffle-sum: coercion-resistant verifiable tallying for STV voting
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
The effectiveness of receipt-based attacks on ThreeBallot
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Short ballot assumption and threeballot voting protocol
SOFSEM'08 Proceedings of the 34th conference on Current trends in theory and practice of computer science
Simulation-based analysis of E2E voting systems
VOTE-ID'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on E-voting and identity
Electronic Elections: Trust Through Engineering
RE-VOTE '09 Proceedings of the 2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems
Can end-to-end verifiable e-voting be explained easily?
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Information Integration and Web-based Applications & Services
HotSec'09 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
Lagrangian e-voting: verifiability on demand and strong privacy
TRUST'10 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Trust and trustworthy computing
Performance requirements for end-to-end verifiable elections
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Eperio: mitigating technical complexity in cryptographic election verification
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Proving coercion-resistance of scantegrity II
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Anonymity and verifiability in voting: understanding (un)linkability
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Practical remote end-to-end voting scheme
EGOVIS'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Electronic government and the information systems perspective
Decentralized polling with respectable participants
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
Scratch, click & vote: e2e voting over the internet
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Attacking paper-based e2e voting systems
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Aperio: high integrity elections for developing countries
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Selections: internet voting with over-the-shoulder coercion-resistance
FC'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
An efficient multi-receipt mechanism for uncoercible anonymous electronic voting
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
An information-theoretic model of voting systems
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Measuring vote privacy, revisited
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Practical Internet voting system
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
A game-based definition of coercion resistance and its applications
Journal of Computer Security - CSF 2010
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We present three new paper-based voting methods with interesting security properties. Our goal is to achieve the same security properties as recently proposed cryptographic voting protocols, but using only paper ballots and no cryptography. From a security viewpoint we get reasonably close, particularly for short ballots. However, our proposals should probably be considered as more "academic" than "practical." In these proposals, not only can each voter verify that her vote is recorded as intended, but she gets a "receipt" she can take home that can be used later to verify that her vote is actually included in the final tally. But her receipt does not allow her to prove to anyone else how she voted. All ballots cast are scanned and published in plaintext on a "public bulletin board" (web site), so anyone may correctly compute the election result. In ThreeBallot, each voter casts three paper ballots, with certain restrictions on how they may be filled out. These paper ballots are of course "voter-verifiable." A voter receives a copy of one of her ballots as her "receipt", which she may take home. Only the voter knows which ballot she copied for her receipt. The voter is unable to use her receipt to prove how she voted or to sell her vote, as the receipt doesn't reveal how she voted. A voter can check that the web site contains a ballot matching her receipt. Deletion or modification of ballots is thus detectable; so the integrity of the election is verifiable. VAV is like ThreeBallot, except that the ballot-marking rules are different: one ballot may "cancel" another (VAV = Vote/Anti-Vote/Vote). VAV is better suited to - i.e. yields better security properties for - Plurality and preference (Borda, Condorcet, IRV) voting, while ThreeBallot is better suited for Approval and Range voting. Finally, we introduce "Floating Receipts," wherein voters may take home a copy of another voter's ballot. (She doesn't know whose ballot, though.) Floating Receipts are well-tuned to the security requirements of ThreeBallot-like schemes, and we examine protocols for achieving them. Our final voting system, Twin, is based almost entirely on Floating Receipts. Each voter casts a single ballot and takes home a single receipt. Twin is quite simple and close to being practical.