Secret sharing homomorphisms: keeping shares of a secret secret
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Communications of the ACM
Practical byzantine fault tolerance and proactive recovery
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Anonymity without 'Cryptography'
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Three voting protocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and twin
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
SybilLimit: A Near-Optimal Social Network Defense against Sybil Attacks
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
E-voting without 'cryptography'
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Secretive birds: privacy in population protocols
OPODIS'07 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Principles of distributed systems
SSS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Stabilization, safety, and security of distributed systems
Decentralized polling with respectable participants
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
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We consider the polling problem in a social network where participants care about their reputation: they do not want their vote to be disclosed nor their misbehaving, if any, to be publicly exposed. Assuming this reputation concern, we show that a simple secret sharing scheme, combined with verification procedures, can efficiently enable polling without the need for any central authority or heavyweight cryptography. More specifically, we present DPol, a simple and scalable distributed polling protocol where misbehaving nodes are exposed with a non-zero probability and the probability of dishonest participants violating privacy is balanced with their impact on the accuracy of the polling result. The trade-off is captured by a generic parameter of the protocol, an integer k we call the privacy parameter , so that in a system of N nodes with $B dishonest participants, the probability of disclosing a participant's vote is bounded by (B /N ) k + 1, whereas the impact on the polling result is bounded by (6k + 2) B . We report on the deployment of DPolover 400 PlanetLab nodes. The polling result suffers a relative error of less than 10% in the face of message losses, crashes and asynchrony inherent in PlanetLab. In the presence of dishonest nodes, our experiments show that the impact on the polling result is (4k + 1) B on average, consistently lower that the theoretical bound of (6k + 2) B .