E-voting without 'cryptography'

  • Authors:
  • Dahlia Malkhi;Ofer Margo;Elan Pavlov

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel;School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel;School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

  • Venue:
  • FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

We present a new, distributed e-voting protocol, which does not require any 'conventional' cryptography, or other means of non-trivial math, and is information-theoretically secure. In our system, the voter receives a receipt confirming her vote, and does not need to trust any pollster to correctly encrypt her vote, or convey it to the talliers. The system can withstand corruption of almost half the number of authorities running the elections. To achieve these goals, we present enhanced check vectors, a new weak signature scheme as well as a new protocol for joint creation of weak signatures by multiple servers.