A protocol to set up shared secret schemes without the assistance of mutually trusted party
EUROCRYPT '90 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Communications of the ACM
Efficient construction of vote-tags to allow open objection to the tally in electronic elections
Information Processing Letters
Sensus: A Security-Conscious Electronic Polling System for the Internet
HICSS '97 Proceedings of the 30th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences: Information System Track-Organizational Systems and Technology - Volume 3
Two Variations to the mCESG Pollsterless E-Voting Scheme
COMPSAC '05 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference - Volume 01
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
E-voting without 'cryptography'
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Secure internet voting with code sheets
VOTE-ID'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on E-voting and identity
CodeVoting protection against automatic vote manipulation in an uncontrolled environment
VOTE-ID'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on E-voting and identity
Simple and efficient hash-based verifiable mixing for remote electronic voting
Computer Communications
Internet voting system with cast as intended verification
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
| Hi-index | 0.24 |
In order for remote electronic voting systems to be reliable, voter verification is an essential feature. Most pre-encrypted ballot schemes proposed to date allow voters to verify that their votes have been properly recorded in the voting server. Such verification makes it possible to detect manipulation of the vote in the voting terminal or during its transmission. However, these schemes do not allow voters to verify that their votes have been accurately included in the counting process. In this paper, we describe a new proposal that solves this problem. Under the proposed scheme, voters can verify that their votes have been properly recorded, and they also have the opportunity to individually verify that their votes have been properly included in the counting process. Voter verification is thus achieved in two different contexts: proper recording and accurate counting.