Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Guaranteed Correct Sharing of Integer Factorization with Off-Line Shareholders
PKC '98 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
A Verifiable Secret Shuffle of Homomorphic Encryptions
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Incoercible multiparty computation
FOCS '96 Proceedings of the 37th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Scratch & vote: self-contained paper-based cryptographic voting
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Implementing STV securely in Pret a Voter
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Ballot casting assurance via voter-initiated poll station auditing
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Three voting protocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and twin
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Administrative and public verifiability: can we have both?
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Coercion-resistant tallying for STV voting
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Efficient proofs that a committed number lies in an interval
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Multi-party indirect indexing and applications
ASIACRYPT'07 Proceedings of the Advances in Crypotology 13th international conference on Theory and application of cryptology and information security
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
A private stable matching algorithm
FC'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Improved efficiency for private stable matching
CT-RSA'07 Proceedings of the 7th Cryptographers' track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Pretty good democracy for more expressive voting schemes
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Parallel shuffling and its application to prêt à voter
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Using Prêt à Voter in Victorian state elections
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
Linear logical voting protocols
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
On the side-effects of introducing e-voting
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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There are many advantages to voting schemes in which voters rank all candidates in order, rather than just choosing their favorite. However, these schemes inherently suffer from a coercion problem when there are many candidates, because a coercer can demand a certain permutation from a voter and then check whether that permutation appears during tallying. Recently developed cryptographic voting protocols allow anyone to audit an election (universal verifiability), but existing systems are either not applicable to ranked voting at all, or reveal enough information about the ballots to make voter coercion possible. We solve this problem for the popular single transferable vote (STV) ranked voting system, by constructing an algorithm for the verifiable tallying of encrypted votes. Our construction improves upon existing work because it extends to multiple-seat STV and reveals less information than other schemes. The protocol is based on verifiable shuffling of homomorphic encryptions, a well-studied primitive in the voting arena. Our protocol is efficient enough to be practical, even for a large election.