Efficient anonymous channel and all/nothing election scheme
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Optimistic Mixing for Exit-Polls
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
A Verifiable Secret Shuffle of Homomorphic Encryptions
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
STOC '82 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme: a practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Simple and efficient shuffling with provable correctness and ZK privacy
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
VoteBox: a tamper-evident, verifiable electronic voting system
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Administrative and public verifiability: can we have both?
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
The case for networked remote voting precincts
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
VOTE-ID '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity
Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Theory and practice of electronic governance
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Shuffle-sum: coercion-resistant verifiable tallying for STV voting
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
VoteBox nano: a smaller, stronger FPGA-based voting machine
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Electing a university president using open-audit voting: analysis of real-world use of Helios
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
On subliminal channels in encrypt-on-cast voting systems
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Anonymity and verifiability in voting: understanding (un)linkability
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Practical remote end-to-end voting scheme
EGOVIS'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Electronic government and the information systems perspective
Adapting helios for provable ballot privacy
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Towards Trustworthy Elections
An efficient and highly sound voter verification technique and its implementation
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Single layer optical-scan voting with fully distributed trust
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Paperless independently-verifiable voting
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Trivitas: voters directly verifying votes
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Practical Internet voting system
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Distributed ElGamal à la Pedersen: Application to Helios
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy
Journal of Computer Security
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The technology for verifiable, open-audit elections has advanced substantially since research on this topic began a quarter century ago. Many of the problems are well-understood and have solid solutions. Ballot casting assurance -- the problem of ensuring that a programmatically encrypted ballot matches the intentions of an individual human voter -- has recently been recognized as perhaps the last substantial obstacle to making this technology fully viable. Several clever schemes have been developed to engage humans in interactive proofs to challenge and check validity of each ballot cast, but such a high standard may be neither practical nor necessary. If done properly, substantial integrity can be obtained by giving voters and observers the option to challenge ballot validity without requiring all voters to do so. This option can be made unobtrusive so as to not interfere with the normal process for most voters, but there are numerous risks and subtleties that necessitate a careful examination of the process. This paper identifies some heretofore unobserved issues with this "simple" method of casting ballots and describes a detailed process that mitigates all known threats. In doing so, it provides a blueprint for how verifiable, open-audit elections can reasonably be conducted in practice.