A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Cryptographic voting protocols: a systems perspective
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme: a practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
System and network trustworthiness in perspective
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Ballot casting assurance via voter-initiated poll station auditing
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Analysis, improvement and simplification of Prêt à voter with Paillier encryption
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
VOTE-ID '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity
VeryVote: A Voter Verifiable Code Voting System
VOTE-ID '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity
Voting with unconditional privacy by merging Prêt à voter and PunchScan
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Information-theoretic security without an honest majority
ASIACRYPT'07 Proceedings of the Advances in Crypotology 13th international conference on Theory and application of cryptology and information security
Bingo voting: secure and coercion-free voting using a trusted random number generator
VOTE-ID'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on E-voting and identity
Electing a university president using open-audit voting: analysis of real-world use of Helios
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Efficient receipt-free ballot casting resistant to covert channels
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Algorithms and theory of computation handbook
Anonymity and verifiability in voting: understanding (un)linkability
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
E-voting: a new approach using double-blind identity-based encryption
EuroPKI'10 Proceedings of the 7th European conference on Public key infrastructures, services and applications
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Attacking paper-based e2e voting systems
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Improving Helios with everlasting privacy towards the public
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
An efficient and highly sound voter verification technique and its implementation
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Trivitas: voters directly verifying votes
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Secure internet voting protocol for overseas military voters
SP'12 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Security Protocols
Vote-ID'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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We propose that voting protocols be judged in part on ballot casting assurance, a property which complements universal verifiability. Some protocols already support ballot casting assurance, though the concept has not received adequate explicit emphasis. Ballot casting assurance captures two well known voting concepts - cast as intended, and recorded as cast - into one end-to-end property: Alice, the voter, should obtain immediate and direct assurance that her intended vote has "made it" into the tally. We review Neff's scheme, MarkPledge, and show that it provides ballot casting assurance. We also briefly show how Chaum's "Punchscan" system also provides ballot casting assurance, though under more complicated deployment assumptions. We show how ballot casting assurance opens the door to realistic failure detection and recovery in the middle of an election, a topic which has been ignored in much of the voting literature.