Information-theoretic security without an honest majority

  • Authors:
  • Anne Broadbent;Alain Tapp

  • Affiliations:
  • Université de Montréal, Département d'informatique et de recherche opérationnelle, Montréal, Québec, Canada;Université de Montréal, Département d'informatique et de recherche opérationnelle, Montréal, Québec, Canada

  • Venue:
  • ASIACRYPT'07 Proceedings of the Advances in Crypotology 13th international conference on Theory and application of cryptology and information security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

We present six multiparty protocols with information-theoretic security that tolerate an arbitrary number of corrupt participants. All protocols assume pairwise authentic private channels and a broadcast channel (in a single case, we require a simultaneous broadcast channel). We give protocols for veto, vote, anonymous bit transmission, collision detection, notification and anonymous message transmission. Not assuming an honest majority, in most cases, a single corrupt participant can make the protocol abort. All protocols achieve functionality never obtained before without the use of either computational assumptions or of an honest majority.