Secret Sharing Schemes with Detection of Cheaters for a General Access Structure

  • Authors:
  • Sergio Cabello;Carles Padró;Germán Sáez

  • Affiliations:
  • Institute of Information and Computing Sciences, Universiteit Utrecht, PO Box 80.089, 3508TB Utrecht, The Netherlandssergio@cs.uu.nl;Dep. Matemàtica Aplicada IV, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Mòdul C3, Campus Nord, C. Jordi Girona 1–3, 08034 Barcelonamatcpl@mat.upc.es;Dep. Matemàtica Aplicada IV, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Mòdul C3, Campus Nord, C. Jordi Girona 1–3, 08034 Barcelonagerman@mat.upc.es

  • Venue:
  • Designs, Codes and Cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

In a secret sharing scheme, some participants can lie about the value of their shares when reconstructing the secret in order to obtain some illicit benefit. We present in this paper two methods to modify any linear secret sharing scheme in order to obtain schemes that are unconditionally secure against that kind of attack. The schemes obtained by the first method are robust, that is, cheaters are detected with high probability even if they know the value of the secret. The second method provides secure schemes, in which cheaters that do not know the secret are detected with high probability. When applied to ideal linear secret sharing schemes, our methods provide robust and secure schemes whose relation between the probability of cheating and the information rate is almost optimal. Besides, those methods make it possible to construct robust and secure schemes for any access structure.