Attacking paper-based e2e voting systems

Authors:
John Kelsey;Andrew Regenscheid;Tal Moran;David Chaum
Affiliations:
National Institute of Standards and Technology;National Institute of Standards and Technology;Harvard SEAS Institute of Science;No Institute Given
Venue:
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Year:
2010

Citing 8
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Abstract

In this paper, we develop methods for constructing vote-buying/coercion attacks on end-to-end voting systems, and describe vote-buying/coercion attacks on three proposed end-to-end voting systems: Punchscan, Prêt-à-voter, and ThreeBallot. We also demonstrate a different attack on Punchscan, which could permit corrupt election officials to change votes without detection in some cases. Additionally, we consider some generic attacks on end-to-end voting systems.