How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Efficient anonymous channel and all/nothing election scheme
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Scratch & vote: self-contained paper-based cryptographic voting
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Split-ballot voting: everlasting privacy with distributed trust
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Ballot casting assurance via voter-initiated poll station auditing
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
A robust and verifiable cryptographically secure election scheme
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting
IEEE Security and Privacy
CRYPTO 2008 Proceedings of the 28th Annual conference on Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Human Readable Paper Verification of Prêt à Voter
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
VoteBox: a tamper-evident, verifiable electronic voting system
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Administrative and public verifiability: can we have both?
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Analysis, improvement and simplification of Prêt à voter with Paillier encryption
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Secure Hamming Distance Based Computation and Its Applications
ACNS '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Fingerprinting Blank Paper Using Commodity Scanners
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Improving and Simplifying a Variant of Prêt à Voter
VOTE-ID '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Ballot permutations in prêt à voter
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
HotSec'09 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
Clearvote: an end-to-end voting system that distributes privacy between printers
Proceedings of the 9th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
On the use of financial data as a random beacon
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Eperio: mitigating technical complexity in cryptographic election verification
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Basing cryptographic protocols on tamper-evident seals
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Prêt à voter with re-encryption mixes
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Scratch, click & vote: e2e voting over the internet
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Attacking paper-based e2e voting systems
Towards Trustworthy Elections
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We present a new approach for cryptographic end-to-end verifiable optical-scan voting. Ours is the first that does not rely on a single point of trust to protect ballot secrecy while simultaneously offering a conventional single layer ballot form and unencrypted paper trail. We present two systems following this approach. The first system uses ballots with randomized confirmation codes and a physical in-person dispute resolution procedure. The second system improves upon the first by offering an informational dispute resolution procedure and a public paper audit trail through the use of self-blanking invisible ink confirmation codes. We then present a security analysis of the improved system.