A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Handbook of Combinatorial Designs, Second Edition (Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications)
Handbook of Combinatorial Designs, Second Edition (Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications)
Analysis, improvement and simplification of Prêt à voter with Paillier encryption
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Prêt à voter with re-encryption mixes
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Prêt à Voter with Paillier encryption
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Parallel shuffling and its application to prêt à voter
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Single layer optical-scan voting with fully distributed trust
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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Handling full permutations of the candidate list along with re-encryption mixes is rather difficult in Prêt à Voter but handling cyclic shifts is straightforward. One of the versions of Prêt à Voter that uses Paillier encryption allows general permutations of candidates on the ballot, rather than just cyclic shifts. This improves the robustness of the system against an adversary who tries to alter checkmarks on ballots before they are posted to the bulletin board. Even if the adversary could predict which voters would fail to check their vote on the bulletin board, the best they could do would be to choose another random candidate. By contrast, when using only cyclic shifts the adversary can systematically shift a biased distribution from one candidate to another. We show in this note that the Paillier version of Prêt à Voter with full permutations of the candidates is not receipt-free when the number of possible permutations is much larger than the number of voters, and we propose a construction that addresses this issue while retaining the defence against an adversary who can shift checkmarks.