How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Communications of the ACM
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Cryptography: Theory and Practice,Second Edition
Cryptography: Theory and Practice,Second Edition
Wallet Databases with Observers
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
FOCS '99 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A variant of the Chaum voter-verifiable scheme
WITS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security
IEEE Security and Privacy
Scratch & vote: self-contained paper-based cryptographic voting
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Implementing STV securely in Pret a Voter
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Analysis, improvement and simplification of Prêt à voter with Paillier encryption
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Kleptographic attacks on e-voting schemes
ETRICS'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Security
Simple and efficient shuffling with provable correctness and ZK privacy
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Prêt à voter with re-encryption mixes
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
New directions in cryptography
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Analysis, improvement and simplification of Prêt à voter with Paillier encryption
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Ballot permutations in prêt à voter
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Parallel shuffling and its application to prêt à voter
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Prêt à voter with confirmation codes
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Using Prêt à Voter in Victorian state elections
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
Feasibility analysis of Prêt à voter for german federal elections
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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It is immensely challenging to devise a voting system that guarantees both the correct reflection of the will of the voters and the secrecy of the ballots, based solely on compelling, objective evidence. In response to this challenge, various voting protocols have been proposed, typically using cryptography, that seek to base the assurance of accuracy on transparency and auditability. This approach is neatly captured by the maxim ''verify the election results, not the voting system!''. Such protocols strive to achieve a new requirement, that of voter-verifiability: voters are able to confirm that their vote is accurately counted while maintaining ballot secrecy. This paper describes the concept of voter-verifiability, and it outlines a particular voting protocol, the Pret a Voter protocol, for achieving voter-verifiability. A new version of the protocol that exploits some special features of the Paillier encryption algorithm is presented. This gives a more elegant and robust implementation of Pret a Voter than the previous versions. In particular, the fact that Paillier encryption allows the secret key holder to recover the randomisation as well as the plaintext, enables a simplified auditing of the ballot receipts and avoids the need to provide Zero-Knowledge Proofs. The use of Verified Random Functions is proposed as a way to prevent any manipulation undermining the secrecy requirements. Finally, a new construction of the ballot forms used in the Pret a Voter protocol is presented that allows the ballot forms to carry full permutations of the candidates rather than simple cyclic shifts of earlier, re-encryption mix versions of this protocol.