Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Split-ballot voting: everlasting privacy with distributed trust
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Human Readable Paper Verification of Prêt à Voter
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Improving and Simplifying a Variant of Prêt à Voter
VOTE-ID '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity
Split-ballot voting: Everlasting privacy with distributed trust
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Voting with unconditional privacy by merging Prêt à voter and PunchScan
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Proving coercion-resistance of scantegrity II
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Anonymity and verifiability in voting: understanding (un)linkability
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Prêt à voter with confirmation codes
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Component based electronic voting systems
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Prêt à Voter with Paillier encryption
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Scaling privacy guarantees in code-verification elections
Vote-ID'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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We present a variant of Chaum's voter verifiable election scheme that preserves the essential characteristics of the original whilst being significantly easier to understand and implement.The scheme provides voters with an encrypted receipt that they can use to check that their vote is entered into the tabulation. The scheme provides a high degree of transparency, within the constraints imposed by ballot secrecy. Various checks are performed by independent auditors and the voters themselves to catch any failure to decrypt receipts correctly. Thus assurance of accuracy is provided by close monitoring of the vote capture and processing, with minimal dependence on the voting devices and tellers.Assurance of secrecy is derived from multiple anonymising mixes of the ballot receipts.