Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
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ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
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PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
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CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
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FOCS '96 Proceedings of the 37th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
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WITS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security
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Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
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SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
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IEEE Security and Privacy
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EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Proving in zero-knowledge that a number is the product of two safe primes
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Everlasting security in the bounded storage model
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Improving Helios with everlasting privacy towards the public
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
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Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Prêt à voter providing everlasting privacy
Vote-ID'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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In this article, we propose a new voting protocol with several desirable security properties. The voting stage of the protocol can be performed by humans without computers; it provides every voter with the means to verify that all the votes were counted correctly (universal verifiability) while preserving ballot secrecy. The protocol has “everlasting privacy”: Even a computationally unbounded adversary gains no information about specific votes from observing the protocol's output. Unlike previous protocols with these properties, this protocol distributes trust between two authorities: a single corrupt authority will not cause voter privacy to be breached. Finally, the protocol is receipt-free: A voter cannot prove how she voted even if she wants to do so. We formally prove the security of the protocol in the universal composability framework, based on number-theoretic assumptions.