Proc. of a workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology---EUROCRYPT '85
How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Multiparty Computations Ensuring Privacy of Each Party's Input and Correctness of the Result
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
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Sharing Decryption in the Context of Voting or Lotteries
FC '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Scratch & vote: self-contained paper-based cryptographic voting
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Secure Distributed Key Generation for Discrete-Log Based Cryptosystems
Journal of Cryptology
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
Split-ballot voting: everlasting privacy with distributed trust
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting
IEEE Security and Privacy
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Split-ballot voting: Everlasting privacy with distributed trust
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Voting with unconditional privacy by merging Prêt à voter and PunchScan
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Multi-authority secret-ballot elections with linear work
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme: a practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Secure applications of Pedersen's distributed key generation protocol
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Electing a university president using open-audit voting: analysis of real-world use of Helios
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Attacking and Fixing Helios: An Analysis of Ballot Secrecy
CSF '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Towards Trustworthy Elections
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Prêt à voter providing everlasting privacy
Vote-ID'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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In this paper we propose improvements on the Helios voting protocol such that the audit data published by the authority provides everlasting privacy, as opposed to the computational privacy provided currently. We achieve this with minor adjustments to the current implementation. For the homomorphic Helios variant we use Pedersen commitments to encode the vote, together with homomorphic encryption over a separate, private channel between the user and Helios server to send the decommitment values. For the mix-net variant we apply a recent result which shows that mixing with everlasting privacy is possible. Observe that we do not claim everlasting privacy towards the server, which, if dishonest, could try to break the homomorphic encryption scheme used in the private channel. Thus towards the authority the voter's level of privacy is identical to what Helios currently offers. However, our protocol is much harder to attack by an outsider: apart from having to break the computational assumption, an adversary must intercept the communication between the voter and the server to violate ballot privacy of that voter. The feasibility of such an attack depends on the way both parties choose to implement this channel. Both contributions are generic in the sense that they can be applied to other voting protocols that use homomorphic tallying or mixnets.