Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
A variant of the Chaum voter-verifiable scheme
WITS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
Cryptographic voting protocols: a systems perspective
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Ballot casting assurance via voter-initiated poll station auditing
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Three voting protocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and twin
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
An Epistemic Approach to Coercion-Resistance for Electronic Voting Protocols
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Anonymity and verifiability are crucial security requirements for voting. Still, they seem to be contradictory, and confusion exists about their precise meanings and compatibility. In this paper, we resolve the confusion by showing that both can be expressed in terms of (un)linkability: while anonymity requires unlinkability of voter and vote, verifiability requires linkability of voters and election result. We first provide a conceptual model which captures anonymity as well as verifiability. Second, we express the semantics of (un)linkability in terms of (in)distinguishability. Third, we provide an adversary model that describes which capabilities the attacker has for establishing links. These components form a comprehensive model for describing and analyzing voting system security. In a case study we use our model to analyze the security of the voting scheme Prêt à Voter. Our work contributes to a deeper understanding of anonymity and verifiability and their correlation in voting.