Reasoning about knowledge
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Modal logic
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Probabilistic analysis of an anonymity system
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Epistemic Verification of Anonymity
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
An Indistinguishability-Based Characterization of Anonymous Channels
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
A survey of state-of-the-art in anonymity metrics
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Network data anonymization
A formal framework for quantifying voter-controlled privacy
Journal of Algorithms
Semantics and logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Probabilistic anonymity via coalgebraic simulations
ESOP'07 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Programming
Probabilistic anonymity via coalgebraic simulations
Theoretical Computer Science
A framework for automatically checking anonymity with µCRL
TGC'06 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Trustworthy global computing
Measuring anonymity with relative entropy
FAST'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Formal aspects in security and trust
Untraceability of RFID protocols
WISTP'08 Proceedings of the 2nd IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practices: smart devices, convergence and next generation networks
Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research
Complexity of anonymity for security protocols
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Anonymity and verifiability in voting: understanding (un)linkability
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Anonymity, Privacy, Onymity, and Identity: A Modal Logic Approach
Transactions on Data Privacy
Analysing the MUTE anonymous file-sharing system using the pi-calculus
FORTE'06 Proceedings of the 26th IFIP WG 6.1 international conference on Formal Techniques for Networked and Distributed Systems
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Reasoning about minimal anonymity in security protocols
Future Generation Computer Systems
Formal analysis of privacy for routing protocols in mobile ad hoc networks
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
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This paper provides a formal framework for the analysis of information hiding properties of anonymous communication protocols in terms of epistemic logic.The key ingredient is our notion of observational equivalence, which is based on the cryptographic structure of messages and relations between otherwise random looking messages. Two runs are considered observationally equivalent if a spy cannot discover any meaningful distinction between them.We illustrate our approach by proving sender anonymity and unlinkability for two anonymizing protocols, Onion Routing and Crowds. Moreover, we consider a version of Onion Routing in which we inject a subtle error and show how our framework is capable of capturing this flaw.