The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Analysis of a Security Protocol in µCRL
ICFEM '02 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Formal Engineering Methods: Formal Methods and Software Engineering
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
On the Complexity of Deciding Behavioural Equivalences and Preorders
On the Complexity of Deciding Behavioural Equivalences and Preorders
Cryptographic protocols
Symbolic Model Checking the Knowledge of the Dining Cryptographers
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A distributed algorithm for strong bisimulation reduction of state spaces
International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer (STTT) - Special section on parallel and distributed model checking
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent systems
Journal of Computer Security
Probabilistic analysis of an anonymity system
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Information hiding, anonymity and privacy: a modular approach
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'02
Analysing the BKE-security Protocol with μCRL
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Analysing the MUTE anonymous file-sharing system using the pi-calculus
FORTE'06 Proceedings of the 26th IFIP WG 6.1 international conference on Formal Techniques for Networked and Distributed Systems
Analysis of an electronic voting protocol in the applied pi calculus
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
MCMAS: a model checker for multi-agent systems
TACAS'06 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
Analyzing an Electronic Cash Protocol Using Applied Pi Calculus
ACNS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Specification of Electronic Voting Protocol Properties Using ADM Logic: FOO Case Study
ICICS '08 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
A formal framework for quantifying voter-controlled privacy
Journal of Algorithms
Distributed analysis with µCRL: a compendium of case studies
TACAS'07 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Tools and algorithms for the construction and analysis of systems
Operational and epistemic approaches to protocol analysis: bridging the gap
LPAR'07 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Logic for programming, artificial intelligence and reasoning
Automated verification of equivalence properties of cryptographic protocols
ESOP'12 Proceedings of the 21st European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Design and formal verification of a CEM protocol with transparent TTP
Frontiers of Computer Science: Selected Publications from Chinese Universities
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We present a powerful and flexible method for automatically checking anonymity in a possibilistic general-purpose process algebraic verification toolset. We propose new definitions of a choice anonymity degree and a player anonymity degree, to quantify the precision with which an intruder is able to single out the true originator of a given event or to associate the right event to a given protocol participant. We show how these measures of anonymity can be automatically calculated from a protocol specification in µCRL, by using a combination of dedicated tools and existing state-of-the-art µCRL tools. To illustrate the flexibility of our method we test the Dining Cryptographers problem and the FOO 92 voting protocol. Our definitions of anonymity provide an accurate picture of the different ways that anonymity can break down, due for instance to coallitions of inside intruders. Our calculations can be performed on a cluster of machines, allowing us to check protocols for large numbers of participants.