Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Introduction to Process Algebra
Introduction to Process Algebra
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
µCRL: A Toolset for Analysing Algebraic Specifications
CAV '01 Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
CADP - A Protocol Validation and Verification Toolbox
CAV '96 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Some new attacks upon security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Verification of security protocols using LOTOS-method and application
Computer Communications
Cones and foci for protocol verification revisited
FOSSACS'03/ETAPS'03 Proceedings of the 6th International conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures and joint European conference on Theory and practice of software
A framework for automatically checking anonymity with µCRL
TGC'06 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Trustworthy global computing
Design and formal verification of a CEM protocol with transparent TTP
Frontiers of Computer Science: Selected Publications from Chinese Universities
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In this paper, we present how the process-algebraic language 碌CRL can be used to specify security protocols and discuss the analysis process using the 碌CRL toolset and CADP. To illustrate the feasibility of our approach, we analyzed the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol and reproduced the error found by Gavin Lowe [7]. Two more definitions of authentication are also studied. We give some remarks on our approach and discuss some possible directions for future work.