Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Receipt-Free Electronic Voting Schemes for Large Scale Elections
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Three voting protocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and twin
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Knowledge-based modelling of voting protocols
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Automated Verification of Remote Electronic Voting Protocols in the Applied Pi-Calculus
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Receipt-free electronic voting scheme with a tamper-resistant randomizer
ICISC'02 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
A framework for automatically checking anonymity with µCRL
TGC'06 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Trustworthy global computing
ISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security
Analysis of a receipt-free auction protocol in the applied pi calculus
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
Challenges in ehealth: from enabling to enforcing privacy
FHIES'11 Proceedings of the First international conference on Foundations of Health Informatics Engineering and Systems
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Privacy is a necessary requirement for voting. Without privacy, voters can be forced to vote in specific ways, and the forcing party can check their compliance. But offering privacy does not suffice: if a voter can reduce her privacy, an attacker can force her to do so. In this paper, we distinguish various ways that a voter can communicate with the intruder to reduce her privacy and classify them according to their ability to reduce the privacy of a voter. We develop a framework combining knowledge reasoning and trace equivalences to formally model voting protocols and define voter-controlled privacy. Our framework is quantitative, in the sense that it defines a measure for the privacy of a voter. Therefore, the framework can precisely measure the level of privacy for a voter for each of the identified privacy-reduction classes. The quantification allows our framework to capture receipts that reduce, but not nullify, the privacy of the voter.