Formalising receipt-freeness

Authors:
H. L. Jonker;E. P. de Vink
Affiliations:
Dept. of Math. and Comp. Sc., Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands;Dept. of Math. and Comp. Sc., Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
Venue:
ISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security
Year:
2006

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Abstract

Receipt-freeness is the property of voting protocols that a voter cannot create a receipt which proves how she voted. Since Benaloh and Tuinstra introduced this property, there has been a large amount of work devoted to the construction of receipt-free voting protocols. This paper provides a generic and uniform formalism that captures the notion of a receipt. The formalism is then applied to analyse the receipt-freeness of a number of voting protocols.