A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
On Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections with Linear Work
ARES '07 Proceedings of the The Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Cryptographic voting protocols: a systems perspective
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Split-ballot voting: everlasting privacy with distributed trust
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Ballot casting assurance via voter-initiated poll station auditing
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
A robust and verifiable cryptographically secure election scheme
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
An Epistemic Approach to Coercion-Resistance for Electronic Voting Protocols
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Electing a university president using open-audit voting: analysis of real-world use of Helios
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
ISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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From a legal point of view, freedom and secrecy of the vote are as important as transparency and verifiability of the election. However, it is a challenge to reconcile the corresponding requirements for electronic voting schemes. This paper analyzes the link between individual verifiability on the one hand and anonymity, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance on the other hand. We approach the issue by analyzing remote as well as paper-based cryptographic voting schemes which make use of public bulletin boards. We investigate to which extent the considered protocols meet the above requirements, especially in the long term when computational assumptions may no longer hold. We also give ideas on how to improve the protocols in this respect. The paper aims at providing an overview in order to support election hosts such as companies, associations and government agencies in selecting appropriate e-voting schemes with respect to the priority of either freedom and secrecy of the vote or voter-verifiability.