Improving and Simplifying a Variant of Prêt à Voter
VOTE-ID '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity
Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Theory and practice of electronic governance
Towards a Framework on the Security Requirements for Electronic Voting Protocols
RE-VOTE '09 Proceedings of the 2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems
Proving coercion-resistance of scantegrity II
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Anonymity and verifiability in voting: understanding (un)linkability
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Analysis of a receipt-free auction protocol in the applied pi calculus
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
Anonymity, Privacy, Onymity, and Identity: A Modal Logic Approach
Transactions on Data Privacy
A formal analysis of the norwegian e-voting protocol
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Cobra: toward concurrent ballot authorization for internet voting
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
Formal verification of e-auction protocols
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
A game-based definition of coercion resistance and its applications
Journal of Computer Security - CSF 2010
Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy
Journal of Computer Security
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Coercion resistance is an important and one of themost intricate security requirements of electronicvoting protocols. Several definitions of coercionresistance have been proposed in the literature,including definitions based on symbolic models.However, existing definitions in such models arerather restricted in their scope and quite complex.In this paper, we therefore propose a new definitionof coercion resistance in a symbolic setting, basedon an epistemic approach. Our definition isrelatively simple and intuitive. It allows for afine-grained formulation of coercion resistance andcan be stated independently of a specific, symbolicprotocol and adversary model. As a proof of concept,we apply our definition to three votingprotocols. In particular, we carry out the firstrigorous analysis of the recently proposed Civitassystem.We precisely identify those conditions underwhich this system guarantees coercion resistance orfails to be coercion resistant. We also analyzeprotocols proposed by Lee et al. and Okamoto.