Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
A variant of the Chaum voter-verifiable scheme
WITS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Simulation-Based Security with Inexhaustible Interactive Turing Machines
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Three voting protocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and twin
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
A robust and verifiable cryptographically secure election scheme
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
An Epistemic Approach to Coercion-Resistance for Electronic Voting Protocols
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Bingo voting: secure and coercion-free voting using a trusted random number generator
VOTE-ID'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on E-voting and identity
A Game-Based Definition of Coercion-Resistance and Its Applications
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Accountability: definition and relationship to verifiability
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Formal analysis of an electronic voting system: An experience report
Journal of Systems and Software
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
A formal analysis of the norwegian e-voting protocol
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Measuring vote privacy, revisited
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A game-based definition of coercion resistance and its applications
Journal of Computer Security - CSF 2010
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By now, many voting protocols have been proposed that, among others, are designed to achieve coercion-resistance, i.e., resistance to vote buying and voter coercion. Scantegrity II is among the most prominent and successful such protocols in that it has been used in several elections. However, almost none of the modern voting protocols used in practice, including Scantegrity II, has undergone a rigorous cryptographic analysis. In this paper, we prove that Scantegrity II enjoys an optimal level of coercion-resistance, i.e., the same level of coercion-resistance as an ideal voting protocol (which merely reveals the outcome of the election), except for so-called forced abstention attacks. This result is obtained under the (necessary) assumption that the workstation used in the protocol is honest. Our analysis is based on a rigorous cryptographic definition of coercionresistance we recently proposed. We argue that this definition is in fact the only existing cryptographic definition of coercion-resistance suitable for analyzing Scantegrity II. Our case study should encourage and facilitate rigorous cryptographic analysis of coercion-resistance also for other voting protocols used in practice.