Proving coercion-resistance of scantegrity II
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Analysis of a receipt-free auction protocol in the applied pi calculus
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
Adapting helios for provable ballot privacy
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
A formal analysis of the norwegian e-voting protocol
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Challenges in ehealth: from enabling to enforcing privacy
FHIES'11 Proceedings of the First international conference on Foundations of Health Informatics Engineering and Systems
Cobra: toward concurrent ballot authorization for internet voting
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
Coercion-resistant electronic elections with write-in candidates
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
Measuring vote privacy, revisited
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Distributed ElGamal à la Pedersen: Application to Helios
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
A game-based definition of coercion resistance and its applications
Journal of Computer Security - CSF 2010
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Coercion-resistance is one of the most important and intricate security requirements for voting protocols. Several definitions of coercion-resistance have been proposed in the literature, both in cryptographic settings and more abstract, symbolic models. However, unlike symbolic approaches, only very few voting protocols have been rigorously analyzed within the cryptographic setting. A major obstacle is that existing cryptographic definitions of coercion-resistance tend to be complex and limited in scope: They are often tailored to specific classes of protocols or are too demanding. In this paper, we therefore present a simple and intuitive, yet widely applicable cryptographic definition of coercionresistance, in the style of game-based definitions. This definition allows to precisely measure the level of coercion-resistance a protocol provides. As a proof of concept, we apply our definition to two voting systems, namely, the Bingo voting system and ThreeBallot. The results we obtain are out of the scope of existing approaches. We show that the Bingo voting system provides the same level of coercion-resistance as an ideal voting system. We also precisely measure the degradation of coercion-resistance of ThreeBallot in case the so-called short ballot assumption does not hold and show that the level of coercion-resistance ThreeBallot provides is significantly lower than that of an ideal system, even in case of short ballots.