Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Trusted Computing Platforms: TCPA Technology in Context
Trusted Computing Platforms: TCPA Technology in Context
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
An examination of vote verification technologies: findings and experiences from the Maryland study
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting
IEEE Security and Privacy
A practical guide to trusted computing
A practical guide to trusted computing
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
VoteBox: a tamper-evident, verifiable electronic voting system
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Dynamics of a Trusted Platform: A Building Block Approach
Dynamics of a Trusted Platform: A Building Block Approach
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
TPM meets DRE: reducing the trust base for electronic voting using trusted platform modules
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Verifiable internet voting solving secure platform problem
IWSEC'07 Proceedings of the Security 2nd international conference on Advances in information and computer security
Efficient receipt-free ballot casting resistant to covert channels
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Performance requirements for end-to-end verifiable elections
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
Proving coercion-resistance of scantegrity II
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Applying trustworthy computing to end-to-end electronic voting
Applying trustworthy computing to end-to-end electronic voting
Engineering practical end-to-end verifiable voting systems
Engineering practical end-to-end verifiable voting systems
Attacking paper-based e2e voting systems
Towards Trustworthy Elections
A systematic process-model-based approach for synthesizing attacks and evaluating them
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
Prêt à voter providing everlasting privacy
Vote-ID'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Building on lessons learned from the November 2009 Scantegrity II election in Takoma Park, MD, we propose improvements to the Scantegrity II voting system that (1) automatically print trustworthy receipts for easier on-line verification, (2) highlight ballot features including over/under votes to comply with the Help America Vote Act, and (3) achieve full voter verifiability by eliminating print audits. We call the improved voting system Scantegrity III, which features a new ballot style and a special casting station that highlights ballots and prints receipts. Scantegrity III addresses the major limitations of Scantegrity II and delivers the feature most requested by voters and election officials at the Takoma Park election: printing receipts automatically. We present, analyze, and compare three designs for a Scantegrity receipt printer: a simple image duplicator available to voters in an optional separate station before casting; a mark sense translator, connected to the official ballot scanner, which reads encrypted codenumbers printed on the ballot; and the Scantegrity III casting station, which is an embellished mark sense translator. At the Scantegrity III station, voters cast ballots that include both Scantegrity II codes in invisible ink and Scantegrity I codes in conventional ink; this combination of codes enables print audits to be eliminated. We also design a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) enhancement to bolster privacy, to store keys and verification codes, and to ensure that the correct software is booted. Election integrity does not depend on the correct operation of the TPM. Receipt printers reduce the amount of special voter instruction required, improve accessibility, enable each voter to detect if any additional mark is added to her ballot after casting, and make vote verification easier.