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EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
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STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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FOCS '96 Proceedings of the 37th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
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IEEE Security and Privacy
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EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Secure distributed key generation for discrete-log based cryptosystems
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption
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CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
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SP'12 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Security Protocols
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Open-audit election protocols have, in recent years, focused on the ballot casting process, where the difficulty lies in proving to the unaided voter that the encrypted ballot faithfully captures her intent. We present MarkPledge2, an evolution of Neff's MarkPledge scheme and the first efficient, covert-channel-resistant, receipt-free ballot casting scheme that can be used by humans without trusted hardware. In comparison to the Moran-Naor proposal at CRYPTO 2006 which shares some of our goals, our scheme produces a significantly shorter ballot, prevents covert channels in the ballot, and opts for statistical soundness rather than everlasting privacy (achieving both seems impossible). The human interface remains the same as MarkPledge, requiring of the voter only very-short-string comparisons. This work solves an "interesting open problem" raised in the original Moran-Naor paper.