How to break the direct RSA-implementation of mixes
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
A Model for Secure Protocols and Their Compositions
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Wide-area cooperative storage with CFS
SOSP '01 Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
Government: a better ballot box?
IEEE Spectrum - The amazing vanishing transistor act
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
On the Composition of Secure Systems
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Communications of the ACM - Has the Internet become indispensable?
Privacy issues in an electronic voting machine
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Farsite: federated, available, and reliable storage for an incompletely trusted environment
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Why Johnny can't encrypt: a usability evaluation of PGP 5.0
SSYM'99 Proceedings of the 8th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 8
Hack-a-Vote: Security Issues with Electronic Voting Systems
IEEE Security and Privacy
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Pond: the oceanstore prototype
FAST'03 Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX conference on File and storage technologies
TCC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Theory of Cryptography
IEEE Security and Privacy
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
Security analysis of the diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Three voting protocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and twin
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Are your votes really counted?: testing the security of real-world electronic voting systems
ISSTA '08 Proceedings of the 2008 international symposium on Software testing and analysis
VoteBox: a tamper-evident, verifiable electronic voting system
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Analysis, improvement and simplification of Prêt à voter with Paillier encryption
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
VeryVote: A Voter Verifiable Code Voting System
VOTE-ID '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity
Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Theory and practice of electronic governance
Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Enhancing electronic voting machines on the example of Bingo voting
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Bingo voting: secure and coercion-free voting using a trusted random number generator
VOTE-ID'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on E-voting and identity
Can end-to-end verifiable e-voting be explained easily?
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Information Integration and Web-based Applications & Services
Efficient receipt-free ballot casting resistant to covert channels
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
On subliminal channels in encrypt-on-cast voting systems
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
A model for system-based analysis of voting systems
Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Security protocols
Anonymity and verifiability in voting: understanding (un)linkability
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Remodelling the attacker in voting protocols
Security'08 Proceedings of the 16th International conference on Security protocols
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Kleptographic attacks on e-voting schemes
ETRICS'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Security
Acceptance of voting technology: between confidence and trust
iTrust'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Trust Management
Prêt à voter with re-encryption mixes
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Auditable privacy: on tamper-evident mix networks
FC'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Towards Trustworthy Elections
A threat analysis of prêt à voter
Towards Trustworthy Elections
A verifiable voting protocol based on farnel
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Scratch, click & vote: e2e voting over the internet
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Using Prêt à Voter in Victorian state elections
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
A systematic process-model-based approach for synthesizing attacks and evaluating them
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
A secure mix network with an efficient validity verification mechanism
IDCS'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Internet and Distributed Computing Systems
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Cryptographic voting protocols offer the promise of verifiable voting without needing to trust the integrity of any software in the system. However, these cryptographic protocols are only one part of a larger system composed of voting machines, software implementations, and election procedures, and we must analyze their security by considering the system in its entirety. In this paper, we analyze the security properties of two different cryptographic protocols, one proposed by Andrew Neff and another by David Chaum. We discovered several potential weaknesses in these voting protocols which only became apparent when considered in the context of an entire voting system. These weaknesses include: subliminal channels in the encrypted ballots, problems resulting from human unreliability in cryptographic protocols, and denial of service. These attacks could compromise election integrity, erode voter privacy, and enable vote coercion. Whether our attacks succeed or not will depend on how these ambiguities are resolved in a full implementation of a voting system, but we expect that a well designed implementation and deployment may be able to mitigate or even eliminate the impact of these weaknesses. However, these protocols must be analyzed in the context of a complete specification of the system and surrounding procedures before they are deployed in any large-scale public election.