Designing trust into online experiences
Communications of the ACM
Security considerations for remote electronic voting
Communications of the ACM
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Users and Trust in Cyberspace (Transcript of Discussion)
Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Trust in Electronic Environments
HICSS '03 Proceedings of the 36th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'03) - Track 9 - Volume 9
Point, Click and Vote: The Future of Internet Voting
Point, Click and Vote: The Future of Internet Voting
Analyzing internet voting security
Communications of the ACM - Voting systems
Basic Concepts and Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure Computing
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Procedural Security and Social Acceptance in E-Voting
HICSS '05 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 38th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'05) - Track 5 - Volume 05
RIES — Internet Voting in Action
COMPSAC '05 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference - Volume 01
Cryptographic voting protocols: a systems perspective
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Election Security: Perception and Reality
IEEE Security and Privacy
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Voters' Perceptions of Voting Technology
Social Science Computer Review
Explanation and trust: what to tell the user in security and AI?
Ethics and Information Technology
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Social aspects of security of information systems are often discussed in terms of “actual security” and “perceived security”. This may lead to the hypothesis that e-voting is controversial because in paper voting, actual and perceived security coincide, whereas they do not in electronic systems. In this paper, we argue that the distinction between actual and perceived security is problematic from a philosophical perspective, and we develop an alternative approach, based on the notion of trust. We investigate the different meanings of this notion in computer science, and link these to the philosophical work of Luhmann, who distinguishes between familiarity, confidence and trust. This analysis yields several useful distinctions for discussing trust relations with respect to information technology. We apply our framework to electronic voting, and propose some hypotheses that can possibly explain the smooth introduction of electronic voting machines in the Netherlands in the early nineties.