Non-interactive zero-knowledge and its applications
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings on Advances in cryptology
Secure audit logs to support computer forensics
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Communications of the ACM
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Secure History Preservation Through Timeline Entanglement
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
An Internet Voting System Supporting User Privacy
ACSAC '06 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Secure data export and auditing using data diodes
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
Prerendered user interfaces for higher-assurance electronic voting
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
Cryptographic voting protocols: a systems perspective
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Designing voting machines for verification
USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
Casting votes in the auditorium
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Extending prerendered-interface voting software to support accessibility and other ballot features
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
An examination of the auditability of voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) ballots
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Ballot casting assurance via voter-initiated poll station auditing
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Three voting protocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and twin
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Finding the Evidence in Tamper-Evident Logs
SADFE '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Third International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering
Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme: a practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
The case for networked remote voting precincts
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
VOTE-ID '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity
On voting machine design for verification and testability
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Enhancing electronic voting machines on the example of Bingo voting
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Now do voters notice review screen anomalies? a look at voting system usability
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
VoteBox nano: a smaller, stronger FPGA-based voting machine
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
On subliminal channels in encrypt-on-cast voting systems
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Eperio: mitigating technical complexity in cryptographic election verification
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
Stamp-it: a method for enhancing the universal verifiability of E2E voting systems
ICISS'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information systems security
Authenticated Dictionaries: Real-World Costs and Trade-Offs
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Prêt à voter with confirmation codes
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Using Prêt à Voter in Victorian state elections
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
Single layer optical-scan voting with fully distributed trust
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Paperless independently-verifiable voting
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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Commercial electronic voting systems have experienced many high-profile software, hardware, and usability failures in real elections. While it is tempting to abandon electronic voting altogether, we show how a careful application of distributed systems and cryptographic techniques can yield voting systems that surpass current systems and their analog forebears in trustworthiness and usability. We have developed the VoteBox, a complete electronic voting system that combines several recent e-voting research results into a coherent whole that can provide strong end-to-end security guarantees to voters. VoteBox machines are locally networked and all critical election events are broadcast and recorded by every machine on the network. VoteBox network data, including encrypted votes, can be safely relayed to the outside world in real time, allowing independent observers with personal computers to validate the system as it is running. We also allow any voter to challenge a VoteBox, while the election is ongoing, to produce proof that ballots are cast as intended. The VoteBox design offers a number of pragmatic benefits that can help reduce the frequency and impact of poll worker or voter errors.