Transparency and access to source code in electronic voting
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
An independent audit framework for software dependent voting systems
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Casting votes in the auditorium
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
On the difficulty of validating voting machine software with software
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Are your votes really counted?: testing the security of real-world electronic voting systems
ISSTA '08 Proceedings of the 2008 international symposium on Software testing and analysis
VoteBox: a tamper-evident, verifiable electronic voting system
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Replayable voting machine audit logs
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
On voting machine design for verification and testability
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Development, formal verification, and evaluation of an E-voting system with VVPAT
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
VoteBox nano: a smaller, stronger FPGA-based voting machine
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Security analysis of India's electronic voting machines
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Toward a system of checks and balances for electronic voting machines
2009 Information Security Curriculum Development Conference
Procedural security analysis: A methodological approach
Journal of Systems and Software
Designing for audit: a voting machine with a tiny TCB
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
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We provide techniques to help vendors, independent testing agencies, and others verify critical security properties in direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines. We rely on specific hardware functionality, isolation, and architectural decision to allow one to easily verify these critical security properties; we believe our techniques will help us verify other properties as well. Verification of these security properties is one step towards a fully verified voting machine, and helps the public gain confidence in a critical tool for democracy. We present a voting system design and discuss our experience building a prototype implementation based on the design in Java and C.