Anti-presistence: history independent data structures
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Xen and the art of virtualization
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Algorithms and data structures for flash memories
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Designing voting machines for verification
USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
An independent audit framework for software dependent voting systems
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Casting votes in the auditorium
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Building reliable voting machine software
Building reliable voting machine software
Improving Voting System Event Logs
RE-VOTE '09 Proceedings of the 2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems
E-voting and forensics: prying open the black box
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Towards publishable event logs that reveal touchscreen faults
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Auditing a DRE-based election in South Carolina
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
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Audit logs are an important tool for post-election investigations, in the event of an election dispute or problem. We propose a new approach to logging that is designed to provide a record of all interactions between each voter and the voting machine. Our audit logs provide a comprehensive, trustworthy, replayable record of essentially everything the voter saw and did in the voting booth, providing investigators a tool for reconstructing voter intent and diagnosing election problems. We show how our design preserves voter anonymity and protects against vote-buying and coercion. We implement a prototype logging subsystem, built on the Pvote voting platform, and demonstrate that the approach is feasible.