Replayable voting machine audit logs
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Automating voting terminal event log analysis
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Towards publishable event logs that reveal touchscreen faults
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Automated analysis of election audit logs
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
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Following a highly publicized and anomalous outcome in the South Carolina statewide Democratic primary South Carolina in June 2010, the authors undertook to audit the election results based on data obtainable through the Freedom of Information Act. The state votes entirely on paperless ES&S iVotronic Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines. There is thus no auditable primary data (such as paper ballots), but there are several audit trail files that are produced by the software of the ES&S system. We have analyzed these files and have been able to show that votes were not counted, that procedures that should have been checked automatically were not checked, and that vote data to support the certified counts has not been collected or stored.