On estimating the size and confidence of a statistical audit
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Machine-assisted election auditing
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
An examination of the auditability of voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) ballots
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
OpenScan: a fully transparent optical scan voting system
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Single-ballot risk-limiting audits using convex optimization
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Auditing a DRE-based election in South Carolina
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Applying a reusable election threat model at the county level
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Probing the front lines: pollworker perceptions of security & privacy
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
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In light of the systemic vulnerabilities uncovered by recent reviews of deployed e-voting systems, the surest way to secure the voting process would be to scrap the existing systems and design new ones. Unfortunately, engineering new systems will take years, and many jurisdictions are unlikely to be able to afford new equipment in the near future. In this paper we ask how jurisdictions can make the best use of the equipment they already own until they can replace it. Starting from current practice, we propose defenses that involve new but realistic procedures, modest changes to existing software, and no changes to existing hardware. Our techniques achieve greatly improved protection against outsider attacks: they provide containment of viral spread, improve the integrity of vote tabulation, and offer some detection of individual compromised devices. They do not provide security against insiders with access to election management systems, which appears to require significantly greater changes to the existing systems.