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ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Fixing federal e-voting standards
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IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
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SADFE '07 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering
A model of forensic analysis using goal-oriented logging
A model of forensic analysis using goal-oriented logging
Communications of the ACM
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IEEE Security and Privacy
Of Paper Trails and Voter Receipts
HICSS '08 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 41st Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
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SADFE '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Third International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering
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IEEE Security and Privacy
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SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Building reliable voting machine software
Building reliable voting machine software
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HICSS '09 Proceedings of the 42nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Vote Selling, Voter Anonymity, and Forensic Logging of Electronic Voting Machines
HICSS '09 Proceedings of the 42nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Replayable voting machine audit logs
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
We have met the enemy and he is us
Proceedings of the 2008 workshop on New security paradigms
Modeling and analyzing faults to improve election process robustness
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
A systematic process-model-based approach for synthesizing attacks and evaluating them
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
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Over the past six years, the nation has moved rapidly from punch cards and levers to electronic voting systems. These new systems have occasionally presented election officials with puzzling technical irregularities. The national experience has included unexpected and unexplained incidents in each phase of the election process: preparations, balloting, tabulation, and reporting results. Quick technical or managerial assessment can often identify the cause of the problem, leading to a simple and effective solution. But other times, the cause and scope of anomalies cannot be determined. In this paper, we describe the application of a model of forensics to the types of technical incidents that arise in computer-based voting technologies. We describe the elements of e-voting that current forensic techniques can address, as well as the need for a more structured analysis, and how this can be achieved given modifications to the design of e-voting systems. We also demonstrate how some concrete forensic techniques can be utilized today by election officials and their agents, to understand voting system events and indicators. We conclude by reviewing best practices for structuring a formal forensics team, and suggest legal steps and contractual provisions to undergird the team's authority and work.