Attack net penetration testing
Proceedings of the 2000 workshop on New security paradigms
A requires/provides model for computer attacks
Proceedings of the 2000 workshop on New security paradigms
LAMBDA: A Language to Model a Database for Detection of Attacks
RAID '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Using Little-JIL to Coordinate Agents in Software Engineering
ASE '00 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE international conference on Automated software engineering
Two Formal Analys s of Attack Graphs
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Using Model Checking to Analyze Network Vulnerabilities
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Flow analysis for verifying properties of concurrent software systems
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Cryptographic voting protocols: a systems perspective
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Toward Models for Forensic Analysis
SADFE '07 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering
International Journal of Information and Computer Security
An Attack Modeling Based on Hierarchical Colored Petri Nets
ICCEE '08 Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on Computer and Electrical Engineering
Modeling and analysis of procedural security in (e)voting: the Trentino's approach and experiences
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
AFIPS '75 Proceedings of the May 19-22, 1975, national computer conference and exposition
E-voting and forensics: prying open the black box
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
The New Jersey voting-machine lawsuit and the AVC advantage DRE voting machine
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
An integrated application of security testing methodologies to e-voting systems
ePart'10 Proceedings of the 2nd IFIP WG 8.5 international conference on Electronic participation
Serial model for attack tree computations
ICISC'09 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Modeling and analyzing faults to improve election process robustness
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Exploiting the client vulnerabilities in internet E-voting systems: hacking Helios 2.0 as an example
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Formal analysis of an electronic voting system: An experience report
Journal of Systems and Software
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Applying a reusable election threat model at the county level
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Improving processes using static analysis techniques
Improving processes using static analysis techniques
Definition and analysis of election processes
SPW/ProSim'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Software Process Simulation and Modeling
Go with the flow: toward workflow-oriented security assessment
Proceedings of the 2013 workshop on New security paradigms workshop
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This paper describes a systematic approach for incrementally improving the security of election processes by using a model of the process to develop attack plans and then incorporating each plan into the process model to determine if it can complete successfully. More specifically, our approach first applies fault tree analysis to a detailed election process model to find process vulnerabilities that an adversary might be able to exploit, thus identifying potential attacks. Based on such a vulnerability, we then model an attack plan and formally evaluate the process's robustness against such a plan. If appropriate, we also propose modifications to the process and then reapply the approach to ensure that the attack will not succeed. Although the approach is described in the context of the election domain, it would also seem to be effective in analyzing process vulnerability in other domains.