IEEE Security and Privacy
IEEE Security and Privacy
IEEE Security and Privacy
Communications of the ACM
Security analysis of the diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting
IEEE Security and Privacy
Are your votes really counted?: testing the security of real-world electronic voting systems
ISSTA '08 Proceedings of the 2008 international symposium on Software testing and analysis
Developing and Retaining a Security Testing Mindset
IEEE Security and Privacy
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
A systematic process-model-based approach for synthesizing attacks and evaluating them
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
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Various technical bodies have devised methodologies to guide testers to the selection, design, and implementation of the most appropriate security testing procedures for various contexts. Their general applicability is obviously regarded as a necessary and positive feature, but its consequence is the need for a complex adaptation phase to the specific systems under test. In this work, we aim to devise a simplified, yet effective methodology tailored to suit the peculiar needs related to the security testing of e-voting systems. We pursue our goal by selecting, for each peculiar aspect of these systems, the best-fitting procedures found in the most widely adopted security testing methodologies, at the same time taking into account the specific constraints stemming from the e-voting context to prune the excess of generality that comes with them.