Security analysis of the diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Are your votes really counted?: testing the security of real-world electronic voting systems
ISSTA '08 Proceedings of the 2008 international symposium on Software testing and analysis
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Security analysis of India's electronic voting machines
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Exploiting the client vulnerabilities in internet E-voting systems: hacking Helios 2.0 as an example
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Eperio: mitigating technical complexity in cryptographic election verification
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Security Seals on Voting Machines: A Case Study
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Ethical issues in e-voting security analysis
FC'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Automated analysis of election audit logs
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
A systematic process-model-based approach for synthesizing attacks and evaluating them
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
The bug that made me president a browser- and web-security case study on helios voting
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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As a result of a public-interest lawsuit, by Court order we were able to study, for one month, the hardware and source code of the Sequoia AVC Advantage direct-recording electronic voting machine, which is used throughout New Jersey (and Louisiana), and the Court has permitted us to publicly describe almost everything that we were able to learn. In short, these machines are vulnerable to a wide variety of attacks on the voting process. It would not be in the slightest difficult for a moderately determined group or individual to mount a vote-stealing attack that would be successful and undetectable.