Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Communications of the ACM
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting
IEEE Security and Privacy
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
VoteBox: a tamper-evident, verifiable electronic voting system
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
TPM meets DRE: reducing the trust base for electronic voting using trusted platform modules
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Verifiable internet voting solving secure platform problem
IWSEC'07 Proceedings of the Security 2nd international conference on Advances in information and computer security
Electing a university president using open-audit voting: analysis of real-world use of Helios
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Eperio: mitigating technical complexity in cryptographic election verification
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Stamp-it: a method for enhancing the universal verifiability of E2E voting systems
ICISS'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information systems security
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Optimally robust private information retrieval
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
Using Prêt à Voter in Victorian state elections
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
Coercion-resistant electronic elections with write-in candidates
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
Measuring vote privacy, revisited
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Paperless independently-verifiable voting
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Internet voting: fatally torn between conflicting goals?
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance
Dispute resolution in accessible voting systems: the design and use of audiotegrity
Vote-ID'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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On November 3, 2009, voters in Takoma Park, Maryland, cast ballots for the mayor and city council members using the Scantegrity II voting system--the first time any end-to-end (E2E) voting system with ballot privacy has been used in a binding governmental election. This case study describes the various efforts that went into the election--including the improved design and implementation of the voting system, streamlined procedures, agreements with the city, and assessments of the experiences of voters and poll workers. The election, with 1728 voters from six wards, involved paper ballots with invisible-ink confirmation codes, instant-runoff voting with write-ins, early and absentee (mail-in) voting, dual-language ballots, provisional ballots, privacy sleeves, any-which-way scanning with parallel conventional desktop scanners, end-to-end verifiability based on optional web-based voter verification of votes cast, a full hand recount, thresholded authorities, three independent outside auditors, fully-disclosed software, and exit surveys for voters and pollworkers. Despite some glitches, the use of Scantegrity II was a success, demonstrating that E2E cryptographic voting systems can be effectively used and accepted by the general public.