EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
VoteBox: a tamper-evident, verifiable electronic voting system
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Electing a university president using open-audit voting: analysis of real-world use of Helios
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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Existing proposals for end-to-end independently-verifiable (E2E) voting systems require that voters check the presence of a "receipt" on a secure bulletin board. The tally is then computed from all the receipts. Anyone can determine that the computation is correct-- that is, the computation of the tally from the receipts is universally-verifiable. The fraud detection probability depends on the number of voters checking their receipts and the number of votes modified. This paper proposes an enhancement, Stamp-It, that does not require voters to check published receipts. It allows anyone to determine whether the tally is correctly computed, with probability independent of the number of voters who checked their receipt, extending the universal verifiability of the process. It does not require any additional computations to be performed during the election, and is hence very well-suited for use with the paper-ballot-based E2E systems. Finally, as an add-on, the enhancement does not degrade the original scheme.