How to break the direct RSA-implementation of mixes
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Wallet Databases with Observers
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
A variant of the Chaum voter-verifiable scheme
WITS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security
Batch zero-knowledge proof and verification and its applications
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
VoteBox: a tamper-evident, verifiable electronic voting system
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
HotSec'09 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Prêt à Voter with Paillier encryption
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Attacking the verification code mechanism in the norwegian internet voting system
Vote-ID'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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A scheme is presented in which a Pretty Good Democracy style acknowledgement code mechanism is incorporated into Prêt à Voter. The idea is to provide voters with an immediate, and usable, confirmation at the time of casting of the correct registration of their receipt on the Web Bulletin Board. As with PGD, the registration and revelation of the confirmation code is performed by a threshold set of Trustees. Verification of the registration of the vote is now part of the vote casting and therefore more immediate and convenient for the voters. The scheme presented here is thus more convenient while maintaining the level of verifiability of conventional Prêt à Voter. It also means that we are less reliant on the diligence of voters in later performing checks on the Bulletin Board. It seems probable that this confirmation code mechanism will provide voters with greater confidence that their vote will be accurately tallied.