Small vote manipulations can swing elections
Communications of the ACM - Voting systems
Communications of the ACM - Voting systems
Privacy issues in an electronic voting machine
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Cryptographic voting protocols: a systems perspective
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
FSMC+, a tool for the generation of Java code from statecharts
Proceedings of the 5th international symposium on Principles and practice of programming in Java
Voters' Perceptions of Voting Technology
Social Science Computer Review
Human Readable Paper Verification of Prêt à Voter
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Measuring the Impact of Different Categories of Software Evolution
IWSM/Metrikon/Mensura '08 Proceedings of the International Conferences on Software Process and Product Measurement
A secure and anonymous voter-controlled election scheme
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Democracy in the classroom: an exercise for the first days of CS1
ITiCSE '09 Proceedings of the 14th annual ACM SIGCSE conference on Innovation and technology in computer science education
A Practical Approach to a Reliable Electronic Election
ICCSA '09 Proceedings of the International Conference on Computational Science and Its Applications: Part II
On voting machine design for verification and testability
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Early Requirements for Mechanical Voting Systems
RE-VOTE '09 Proceedings of the 2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems
Managing Requirements for E-Voting Systems: Issues and Approaches
RE-VOTE '09 Proceedings of the 2009 First International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting Systems
Towards trustworthy e-voting using paper receipts
Computer Standards & Interfaces
A model for system-based analysis of voting systems
Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Security protocols
Explanation and trust: what to tell the user in security and AI?
Ethics and Information Technology
Kleptographic attacks on e-voting schemes
ETRICS'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Security
Does ontology influence technological projects? the case of irish electronic voting
WM'05 Proceedings of the Third Biennial conference on Professional Knowledge Management
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Protection profile for secure e-voting systems
ISPEC'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
A secure architecture for voting electronically (SAVE)
Towards Trustworthy Elections
A threat analysis of prêt à voter
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Integrity of electronic voting systems: fallacious use of cryptography
Proceedings of the 27th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Annual Review of Information Science and Technology
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Election officials are examining technologies to address a wide range of voting issues. The problems observed in the November 2000 US election accelerated existing trends to get rid of lever machines, punch-cards, and hand-counted paper ballots and replace them with mark-sense balloting, Internet, and automatic teller machine (ATM) kiosk style computer-based systems. An estimated US $2-$4 billion will be spent in the United States and Canada to update voting systems during the next decade. Voting online might enable citizens to vote even if they are unable to get to the polls. Yet making these methods work right turns out to be considerably more difficult than originally thought. New electronic voting systems pose risks as well as solutions. As it turns out, many of the voting products currently for sale provide less accountability, poorer reliability, and greater opportunity for widespread fraud than those already in use. This paper discusses the technology available and how to ensure accurate ballots.