A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Government: a better ballot box?
IEEE Spectrum - The amazing vanishing transistor act
A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
IEEE Security and Privacy
Cryptographic voting protocols: a systems perspective
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Kleptographic attacks on e-voting schemes
ETRICS'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Security
Analysis of an electronic voting protocol in the applied pi calculus
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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There has recently been keen interest in the threat analysis of voting systems. While it is important to verify the system itself, it has been found that certain vulnerabilities only become apparent when taking a "system-based" view, i.e. considering interactions between the various components of a scheme [1,2]. Threat analysis has so far been of three main forms: system-based, protocol-level and taxonomy check-lists. We discuss these approaches before presenting a model for system-based analysis of voting systems that is more systematic than previous work. Themodel is described in detail, and demonstratedwith an example from a case study of the Randell-Ryan "Scratch Card" voting system [3].