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Farnel is a voting system proposed in 2001 in which each voter signs a ballot. It uses two ballot boxes to avoid the association between a voter and a vote. In this paper we first point out a flaw in the ThreeBallot system proposed by Rivest that seems to have gone unnoticed so far: it reveals statistical information about who is winning the election. Then, trying to resolve this and other flaws, we present a new, voter-verifiable version of the Farnel voting system in which voters retain copies of ballot IDs as receipts.